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Abstract
A physical theory consists of the mathematical formalism and an inter-
pretation, which contains the definition of symbols, measurement assign-
ments, concepts and principles, and an ontology. We present a scheme to
classify these different levels of a physical theory and apply it to Newto-
nian Mechanics and the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. We show
that this classification scheme is embedded in the methodology of philos-
ophy of science. With this scheme, different interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics can be compared concerning the formalism and the used con-
ceptions, and it serves as a guidance to identify ontological entities and
reality conceptions in the different interpretations. Inspired by the com-
mitments on the ontological level, we propose two heuristics concerning
ontological statements.
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1 Introduction
Quantum Mechanics is undoubtedly one of the most successful theories in physics,
but its foundations and interpretations are still a heavily disputed topic. Quan-
tum Mechanics allows for various interpretations, but it is surprising how strong
the differences can be concerning the ontological commitments of these inter-
pretations.
The scope of this work is to propose a classification scheme that will provide
a methodology to analyse the differences of several interpretational approaches
in the mathematical model, the interpretation of the respective mathematical
model, the used concepts, and the ontology. It provides a number of levels to
distinguish between these aspects.
The scheme itself claims not to reflect any ontological aspect on the nature
of theories; the levels could be defined differently and the boundaries between
the levels could be chosen differently, but the proposed scheme is valuable to
contrast the content of different approaches in the interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics.
We present the relation between the classification scheme and approaches to
the structure of scientific theories in philosophy of science. A physical theory
rests also on preconceptions and premises. To illustrate this, a brief overview of
philosophical stances, in context with the conception and structure of physical
theories, is presented.
Connected to the ontological level of the classification scheme, two arguments
are proposed that refer to the ontologies of theories and their interrelation.
By means of an application on classical particle mechanics and on different
interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, we demonstrate the merit of the scheme.
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2 A classification scheme
Interpretational debates as part of the scientific method are as old as science
itself. But no interpretational debate in physics attracted more attention than
the debate in the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics [Landsman, 2006]. The
reason is certainly that it is more than just a debate on different models about
a physical situation. It is a debate with pervasive philosophical implications.
The field of interpretations of Quantum Mechanics seems to be growing continu-
ously, without reconsideration. A quote by David Mermin reflects this situation
[Mermin, 2012]:
“Quantum mechanics is the most useful and powerful theory physi-
cists have ever devised. Yet today, nearly 90 years after its formula-
tion, disagreement about the meaning of the theory is stronger than
ever. New interpretations appear every year. None ever disappear.”
To provide a better overview on the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics,
we propose a classification scheme that categorizes the structure of a physical
theory, particular an interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
A physical theory consists roughly of the mathematical formalism and an in-
terpretation, which contains the definition of symbols, theoretical terms, mea-
surement assignments, concepts and principles, and an ontology. We refine this
coarse breakdown into a four-level classification.
Definition 1. Level 1 of a physical theory is described by a set of mathemat-
ical quantities. These mathematical quantities are in relation to each other by
mathematical laws.
Definition 2. Level 2 of a physical theory is described by a set of measurement
assignments to the mathematical quantities of Level 1. It describes how the
defined quantities in the mathematical description of the theory are related to
sensations and experience. It relates mathematical objects to theoretical terms.
Definition 3. Level 3 of a physical theory is described by a number of concepts
and principles that are related to the mathematical description of the theory.
These principles can be formulated as statements or logical expressions.
Definition 4. Level 4 of a physical theory contains the ontology of the theory
and the metaphysical entities or conceptions that are introduced by the theory.
3
We make use of the following figurative elements to visualize the classification
scheme:
Physical quantity
Law between physical quantities
Concept connecting laws and physical quantities
Elements of objective reality
Table 1: Figurative elements used in the classification scheme
By dots, we depict a physical quantity, which can be the property of a physical
object or any other physical measure that is introduced by the theory. On Level
1 of the classification scheme, a physical quantity is basically a mathematical
symbol. These dots are in relation to each other by mathematical relations, the
laws between the physical quantities. On the first level, these are the math-
ematical laws that are fulfilled by the mathematical symbols representing the
physical quantities.
On the second leyel, the physical quantities receive names and relation to em-
pirical results, the measurement assignments. By that, the pure mathematical
formalism becomes a physical law. The physical quantities and the laws involve
conceptions that are set up by theoretical terms and governed by principles.
These are depicted by the areas spanned by some physical quantities and laws,
and belong to the Level 3 of the classification scheme.
On the ontological level, Level 4, there are entities that are a priori unknown. A
physical theory usually provides a statement on the ontology, statements that
give an insight on the metaphysical reality behind the empirical content. These
statements involve usually entities that exist independently of our perception;
we denote them as elements of objective reality and depict them by a diamond.
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Applying these figurative elements to the classification scheme, we can give an
overview on the scheme:
1
Mathematical laws
between mathematical symbols
2
Interpretation physical quantities
Relation physical quantities - Measurements
Measurement laws
3 Concepts and principles
4
Ontology - beables -
elements of reality
Table 2: Classification scheme
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3 The structure of scientific theories in the frame-
work of philosophy of science
Philosophy of science forms a framework for the scientific method, which evolved
out of early philosophy. Philosophy was and is pervaded by dualities. One of
those foundational dualities is the contrast between Experience and Reason, or
as [Einstein, 1934] puts it into words:
“I want now to glance for a moment at the development of the the-
oretical method, and while doing so especially to observe the rela-
tion of pure theory to the totality of the data of experience. Here is
the eternal antithesis of the two inseparable constituents of human
knowledge, Experience and Reason, within the sphere of physics.”
Another foundational duality is set up by the realist and positivist positions. In
the framework of these dualities, the views of scientists on the construction of
scientific theories evolved in the last century, in a complex way, to a diversity
of positions. We present an overview on those positions that are relevant to the
presented classification scheme, because these positions provide a way to give
structure to scientific theories. We present the positions and their relation to
the classification scheme.
3.1 Einstein’s model of layers
Einstein presented his view on the structure of scientific theories in his work
[Einstein, 1936]:
“Ziel der Wissenschaft ist erstens die mo¨glichst vollsta¨ndige begrif-
fliche Erfassung und Verknu¨pfung der Sinneserlebnisse in ihrer ganzen
Mannigfaltigkeit, zweitens aber die Erreichung dieses Zieles unter
Verwendung eines Minimums yon prima¨ren Begriffen und Relatio-
nen (Streben nach mo¨glichster logischer Einheitlichkeit des Welt-
bildes bezw. logischer Einfachheit seiner Grundlagen). Die Wis-
senschaft braucht die ganze Mannigfaltigkeit der prima¨ren, d.h. un-
mittelbar mit Sinneserlebnissen verknu¨pften Begriffe sowie der sie
verknu¨pfenden Sa¨tze. In ihrem ersten Entwicklungsstadium entha¨lt
sie nichts weiter. Auch das Denken des Alltags begnu¨gt sich im
grossen Ganzen mit dieser Stufe. Diese kann aber einen wirklich wis-
senschaftlich eingestellten Geist nicht befriedigen, da die so gewinnbare
Gesamtheit von Begriffen und Relationen der logischen Einheitlichkeit
vo¨11ig entbehrt. Um diesem Mangel abzuhelfen, erfindet man ein
begriffs- und relationsa¨rmeres System, welches die prima¨ren Begriffe
und Relationen der ”ersten Schicht” als logisch abgeleitete Begriffe
und Relationen entha¨lt. Dieses neue ”sekunda¨re System” erkauft
die gewonnene ho¨here logische Einheitlichkeit mit dem Umsta¨nde,
dass seine an den Anfang gestellten Begriffe (Begriffe der zweiten
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Schicht) nicht mehr unmittelbar mit Komplexen von Sinneserleb-
nissen verbunden sind. ... So geht es fort, bis wir zu einem System
von denkbar gro¨sster Einheitlichkeit und Begriffsarmut der logischen
Grundlagen gelangt sind, das mit der Beschaffenheit des sinnlich
Gegebenen vereinbar ist.”
“The goal of science is in the first place the complete conceptual ac-
quisition and connection of the sensations in all its manifold aspects,
secondly the attainment of this goal with a minimum of primary
terms and relations. (ambition for a optimized logical unity of the
world view, respectively logical simplicity of its foundations). Science
needs the whole manifold of primary terms, i.e. which are directly
connected to sensations, and the statements connecting them. In its
first development stage it contains nothing more. Common sense
thinking is satisfied with this stage. Though this stage cannot satisfy
a truly scientifically oriented mind, since the resulted wholeness of
conceptions and relations totally lacks in logical unity. To resolve
this insufficiency one invents a system more economical in its use of
conception and relations, which integrates the conceptions and rela-
tions of the ”first layer” as logically derivable. This new ”secondary
system” gains the higher logical unity by the circumstance that its
initial conceptions (conceptions of the second layer) are not directly
related to the sensations any more. ... And so it goes forth, until
we reached at a system of at most thinkable unity and parsimony of
logical foundations, which is in agreement with the sensations.1”
The difference to the classification scheme presented before is that Einstein’s
model of layers refers only to Level 1 and 2 of our classification scheme pre-
sented initially. The development of higher layers by unification and definition
of new theoretical terms and concepts evolves the layer concept to the Level 3 of
the classification scheme, to concepts and principles. Einstein’s layer model pic-
tures the evolution of a physical theory from its first conceptions out of common
sense, pure sensations and experience, to a physical theory with a maximum of
parsimony in its used elements.
It is surprising that within this layer model Einstein does not refer to an onto-
logical level. Though the work is written in 1936, it relates to Einstein’s early
positions that are often seen in the positivistic tradition of Mach. A detailed ac-
count on Einstein’s alleged shift from positivism to realism is given by [Howard,
1993].
1Translation by the author
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Figure 1: Einstein’s layers and the embedding to the classification scheme
Einstein’s model of layers is hierarchical and there is a maximum of logical
unity a theory can develop to; it is represented by the highest layer in the
model. The layer model is strongly influenced by the success in the evolution
of Classical Mechanics from ancient conceptions to Newtonian Mechanics and
General Theory of Relativity. It must have been this story of ongoing unification
that motivated Einstein’s view on theory structure.
This view reflects also in the way Einstein presented the historical evolution of
physics [Einstein et al., 1950].
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3.2 The received view
The received or syntactic view is the view on scientific theory that developed
within the framework of Logical Empiricism in the 1920s in the environment of
the Vienna Circle and influence of Machian positivism. A brief summary on the
received view is provided by [Suppe, 1977, p.12]:
“A scientific theory is to be axiomatized in mathematical logic (first-
order predicate calculus with equality). The terms of the logical ax-
iomatization are to be divided into three sorts: (1) logical and mathe-
matical terms; (2) theoretical terms; and (3) observation terms which
are given a phenomenal or observational interpretation.”
Between the theoretical terms and the observational terms, correspondence rules
are defined. Every theoretical term has to have a corresponding observational
term. If not, it would not be an allowed theoretical term within the received
view; it would be what is seen as a metaphysical term, which has no relation to
observations and according to the stance of Logical Empiricism can be neglected.
These correspondence rules act between the Level 1 and 2 of the previously
presented classification scheme. They do not refer to any metaphysical or onto-
logical entity; they only represent relations between experience and theoretical
terms.
Tx ≡ Ox (1)
The received view failed due to several reasons, which we do not present in
detail here. A detailed account is given by [Suppe, 2000], though two main
reasons should be mentioned. Following [Suppe, 2000, p.103], two critiques on
the received view were essential:
“theories are not linguistic entities and thus theories are individuated
incorrectly.”
and
“correspondence rules were a heterogeneous confusion of meaning
relationships, experimental design, measurement, and causal rela-
tionships some of which are not properly parts of theories;”
The received view faced criticism, specifically concerning the position on the
meaning of theoretical terms. As pointed out by [Suppe, 1977, p.13], the sum-
marized slogan of this position is
“The meaning of a term is its method of verification”.
Carl Hempel, a developer and main proponent of the received view, changed his
position during the Illinois Symposium on the Structure of Scientific Theories
in 1969 and questioned one of the cornerstones of the received view [Hempel,
1977, p.253]:
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Figure 2: The received view in the classification scheme
“It presupposes that if theoretical terms have definite meanings, then
it must be possible to construe those terms as introduced by specifiable
logical procedures, which assign them meanings with the help of terms
that are antecedently understood.
This presupposition, which I once thought quite sound, seems to me
mistaken for several reasons...”
This cleared the way for a new view on the structure of scientific theories, the
semantic view, which developed out of the criticism on the received view. For
an early presentation of the received view, refer to [Carnap, 1923]; for detailed
presentations of its failure, refer to [Hempel, 1970] and [Hempel, 1977].
3.3 The semantic view
The semantic view is a position that contrasted and succeeded the received view.
It represents the view that a theory is represented by models, which makes use
of mathematical terms and statements concerning theoretical terms.
[Suppe, 2000, p.105]
“The Semantic Conception identifies theories with certain kinds of
abstract theory-structures, such as configurated state spaces, stand-
ing in mapping relations to phenomena. Theory structures and phe-
nomena are referents of linguistic theory-formulations. The basic
idea is that theory structures are identified with suitably connected
families of models. Depending on mapping relationships required for
theoretical adequacy, realist, quasi-realist or antirealist versions are
obtained.”
Whereas the received view neglected the need for metaphysical terms, the se-
mantic view incorporates both possible polar positions of realism and antirealism
on the question of ontological commitment [Suppe, 2000, p.106]:
“Such commitments are via individual mapping functions (Loc func-
tions) from real-world objects to points in logical space.”
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and
“a realist has Loc functions onto every state variable and maintains a
theory is empirically true just in case theory-structure-allowed state
transitions are identical to those possibly occurring in the actual
world. Antirealists do not commit ontologically to all state variables.
They only require countenancing Loc functions from observables and
that theories be empirically adequate: If W is that portion of reality
to which one attaches Loc functions, the image M* of W is among
the models comprising the theory.”
Within the semantic view, both positions can be represented, depending on
which entities that the Loc functions refer to. Represented in the classifica-
tion scheme presented before, the realist and antirealist positions refer to the
ontological level (Level 4) or to observables inside the theories framework.
Figure 3: Realist and antirealist positions within the semantic view
The semantic view itself has different versions, which have differences concerning
the interpretation and role of confirmation [Da Costa and French, 1990], [Suppe,
2000], [Van Fraassen, 1980].
Out of the semantic view, the structuralist approaches in philosophy of science
emerged.
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3.4 The structuralist approaches
There are several accounts on structuralism. Three main approaches are pre-
sented in [Schmidt, 2014]. We present them, in an overview and their relation
to the classification scheme, in an overview.
An account on the development of the Structuralist Approach out of the Se-
mantic approach is provided by [Suppe, 2000, p.108]:
“Like the Semantic Conception it analyzes theories set-theoretically
as comprised of a theory structure and intended applications, but
is neo-positivistic in spirit and reliance on a relativized theoreti-
cal/nontheoretical term distinction. It began with Sneed’s (1971)
application of Suppes’s (1957) set-theoretic techniques to the prob-
lem of theoretical terms.”
3.4.1 Sneed’s structuralist approach
The structuralist approach by Joseph Sneed is a continuation of the positivistic
end of the semantic view. It utilizes the set-theoretic methods to model a
scientific theory. Hand in hand with the application of set-theory goes the
neglection of linguistic terms [Sneed, 1976, p.144]:
“Roughly speaking the way of talking about scientific theories I am
going to describe invites us to look at sets of ”models” for these
theories rather than the linguistic entities employed to characterize
these models.”
Following the account in [Schmidt, 2014], we present the conception of Sneed’s
approach. A recent introduction to these basic structures in Sneed’s structural-
ism approach and their relation is provided by [Andreas and Zenker, 2014].
According to [Sneed, 1976, p.120], a scientific theory is a
“... conceptual structure that can generate variety of empirical claims
about a loosely specified, but not completely unspecified, range of ap-
plications.”
The structure is built by a core K and a domain of intended application I.
The core contains the class of potential models Mp, which is basically the set
of possible models that describe the situation in terms of the used elements in
the model.
Assigned to the potential models, there is an actual model M that represents
the set of potential models that satisfy empirical laws. Together, they form a
model-element 〈Mp,M〉, the minimum element a theory has to contain.
Mpp is the set of potential models without the theoretical terms that have been
involved in Mp.
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As this Mpp set is difficult to understand without a practical application, we
refer to the example of Hookes law for massive point particles attached to a
spring, presented in [Schmidt, 2014]. If Mp represents the full conceptual frame
with the functions of force, the spring constants, the masses of the point parti-
cles and the position functions of the particles, then Mpp represents the model
without all theoretical terms. This would reduce the partial potential models to
the particles positions as mass, spring constant and forces as theoretical terms.
Since the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms is a peculiar
question we refer to [Andreas, 2016] for an overview of positions and criticism.
Additional to Mp, M and Mpp the core contains constraints C that connect
different models in the same theory, a class of links L that connect to models of
other theories. For example, to describe the position of the point particles, an
account on measuring distances in spacetime is needed 2.
To give an account on the realistic situation of finite values in empirical sciences,
a class of admissible blurs A is introduced, which contains degrees of approxi-
mation 3.
The theory core K and the domain of intended application I form a theory
element 〈K, I〉. The intended application I refers to the empirical data that the
theory refers to; in fact, to the phenomena [Sneed, 1976, p.125]:
“The set I is to be interpreted as the range of intended applications of
the element - what the theory-element is about. The only requirement
(D4) puts on I is that its members have the structure characteristic
of the non-theoretical part of K - that they be members of Mpp.”
Figure 4: The theory core K and the intended application I
2In the structuralist account of Ludwig presented in Section 3.4.2, these links will be
described by Pre-theories
3In the structuralist account of Ludwig presented in Section 3.4.2, these blurs A will be
represented there by inaccuracy sets and unsharp measurements
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Theory elements 〈K, I〉 form with other theory elements, a theory-net N . These
theory-nets represent the complex we usually understand commonly as a scien-
tific theory.
Figure 5: The different elements of the structuralist approach
A theory-net that undergoes a change over time describes a theory evolution I
in time.
One essential concept in this structuralist approach is the extension process,
which describes the reasoning from a limited empirical dataset represented by
T-nontheoretical terms to T-theoretical terms [Ga¨hde, 2014, p.1459-1460]:
“The starting point is provided by a certain set of data which is inter-
preted as a fragment of a model of an empirical theory. Attempts are
made to extend this fragment into a complete model of that theory.
... this extension process is to be described by referring to the distinc-
tion between theoretical and non-theoretical functions with respect to
the theory T in question. The intended applications of that theory
(which comprise the available data) are located at the non-theoretical
level with respect to T and are represented by so-called partial mod-
els. These partial models consist of base sets and T-nontheoretical
functions. By adding suitable T-theoretical functions, they are to be
extended into models of T. ”
Concerning the question on scientific progress, Sneed provides an instrumentalist
answer [Sneed, 1976, p.143]:
“These considerations suggest that perhaps reduction of theories rel-
ative to specific nets is all we need to deal with the question of ’scien-
tific progress’. They suggest that we do not need a concept of theory
in which the possibilities for its future development are so strongly
specified (through a strong specialization concept) that it can be es-
tablished ’once and-for-all’ that one theory can not keep up with an-
other.”
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Sneed’s approach involves no reference to an ontology. It is a purely empirical
account and is therefore confined to the Levels 1 and 2 of the presented clas-
sification scheme. Concepts and principles which are represented by Level 3
would contain linguistic terms and are neglected in the form of a statement by
Sneed’s structuralist approach. Principles like energy or momentum conserva-
tion are represented in the account, but not in the sense of a first order principle.
They are merely empirical statements about and between the involved theory
elements.
In contrast to Sneed’s positivistic approach, a more realistic-oriented approach
has been presented by Gu¨nter Ludwig.
3.4.2 Ludwig’s structuralist approach
Gu¨nter Ludwig presented an approach based on the axiomatization of Quantum
Mechanics embedded in an axiomatization of scientific theories in general. An
overview is provided by [Schmidt, 2014]:
“His(G. Ludwig’s) underlying philosophy is the view that there are
real structures in the world which are pictured or represented, in an
approximate fashion, by mathematical structures, symbolically PT =
W (−)MT . The mathematical theory MT used in a physical theory
PT contains as its core a species of structure . This is a meta-
mathematical concept of Bourbaki which Ludwig introduced into the
structuralistic approach. The contact between MT to some domain of
reality W is achieved by a set of correspondence principles (−), which
give rules for translating physical facts into certain mathematical
statements called observational reports.”
[Ludwig and Thurler, 2007, p.3]
“The reality is in part constituted of facts stating ”basic properties”
of objects and ”basic relations” between objects. Only facts related to
the ”domain of physics” are taken into consideration. These facts,
directly recordable or indirectly recordable via known theories, called
pre-theories, constitute what we call the physically recordable domain
or the reality domain.”
Ludwig introduces the basic structure of a physical theory as the statement
PT = W (−)MT . It is a correspondence between the reality domain and a
mathematical theory. In his last account Ludwig and Thurler [2007] altered the
notion of the correspondence principle and replaced the usage to the symbol
(−), as a representation of the correspondence between the reality domain and
the mathematical theory, with the symbol (cor).
What Ludwig defines as an application domain is introduced by Einstein in his
model of layers as ”first layer” [Ludwig and Thurler, 2007, p.12]:
“The application domain of a particular physical theory PTν , de-
noted by Apν is the restriction of the reality domain Wν to the facts
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that the theory considers a priori. The recording of facts can be made
directly or indirectly by pre-theories.”
A pre-theory is a method to record those a priori given facts; it could, for
example, be a pre-theory of distance measurement. The application domain
is the collection of all those facts that build a basis for the theory PTν . The
application domain of a theory can include reality domains Wα Wβ of other
physical theories PTα, PTβ ; they serve as pre-theories to the physical theory
PTν .
The account of Ludwig contains one specific feature, the consideration of the
finiteness of physics. He introduces inaccuracy sets to give regard to the fact
that numbers of observations are finite, and the mathematical axiomatization
is an idealization which involves an unavoidable inaccuracy.
This also reflects in the domains of physical reality. Additional to the applica-
tion domain of a theory, he introduces a fundamental domain Gν [Ludwig and
Thurler, 2007, p.13]:
“The fundamental domain of a particular physical theory PTν , de-
noted by Gν is the restriction of the application domain Apν to the
facts that the theory describes. ... It is often more useful to apply
the theory only on that part of the application domain Apν where we
can use a small degree of inaccuracy. In such a region the theory
essentially says something about the structure of reality and will be
useful for technical application.”
If the theory PTν provides small inaccuracies over the whole application domain,
the application and foundational domain are equivalent Gν ≡ Apν .
At last there is a reality domain Wν of the physical theory PTν [Ludwig and
Thurler, 2007, p.14]:
“The reality domain of a particular physical theory PTν , denoted by
Wν , is the extension of the fundamental domain Gν to the facts(related
to the new physical concepts) that the theory describes. Our task is
not only to detect ”nonmeasured” realities, but also to detect new
realities.”
The connection between the three domains of physical reality and the mathe-
matical theory MT is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: The three domains of physical reality according to Ludwig
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The three domains of physical reality contain each other as a subset.
Apν ⊂ Gν ⊂Wν (2)
Figure 7: The connection between Ludwig's structuralism approach and the
classification scheme
The reality domain Wν is corresponding, to our definition of the ontological
Level 4 of a physical theory. The mathematical theory corresponds to the Level
1 and the correspondence rules (cor) between the mathematical theory and the
domain of physical reality, which contain the interpretations and the concepts,
refer to the Levels 2 and 3 of the classification scheme.
Ludwig’s approach is at the realistic end of the spectrum of structuralist ac-
counts.
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3.4.3 Scheibe’s structuralist reductionism approach
The third structuralist approach is Erhard Scheibe's account and refers mainly
to the mechanisms of reduction of theories. According to [Schmidt, 2014], his
view can be seen between Sneed's and Ludwig's approaches. Although Scheibe's
approach is not relevant to our discussion on a classification scheme, we mention
his approach and its relation in the context of structuralist accounts. For an
overview, refer to [Scheibe, 2001] and [Scheibe, 2013].
To summarize the idea of structuralist approaches, we refer to [Balzer, 1980,
p.399]:
“Die These des Strukturalismus la¨ßt sich kurz so fassen: Erkenntnis
der Wirklichkeit besteht darin, aus ihr Strukturen herauszulesen und
in sie Strukturen hineinzuinterpretieren.”
“The approach of structuralism explained in short: Insight about
reality persits in perceiving the structures out of nature and inter-
preting structures into the realm of reality.4”
3.5 Epistemological and ontic structural realism
Out of the structuralist ideas, new approaches evolved. Structural realism em-
phasizes the importance of the structural relations and assigns to them central
relevance. The ontological role of objects in structural realism is a matter of
dispute, and the different positions within structural realism assign different
weight to the concept of reality of objects [Ladyman, 2016]:
“The structuralist solution ... is to give up the attempt to learn about
the nature of unobservable entities from science. The metaphysical
import of successful scientific theories consists in their giving cor-
rect descriptions of the structure of the world. Theories can be very
different and yet share all kinds of structure. The task of providing
an adequate theory of approximate truth that fits the history of sci-
ence and directly addresses the problem of ontological continuity has
hitherto defeated realists, but a much more tractable problem is to
display the structural commonalities between different theories.”
This abandoning of unobservable entities has different degrees. Within the
structural realism, the bandwidth goes from a a realistic-oriented epistemologi-
cal structural realism (ESR) to a positivistic-oriented position of ontic structural
realism (OSR).
4Translation by the author
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3.5.1 Epistemological structural realism (ESR)
In the framework of the discussion of realist positions and anti-realist positions
on the meaning of scientific progress and the value of ontological statements,
three main arguments are noteable: The miracle argument by [Putnam, 1975]
defending the position of realism, the Scientific Underdetermination [Stanford,
2016] and the Pessimistic Meta Induction by Laudan [1981] on the side of anti-
realism.
John Worrall attempted to find a synthesis of these ideas and asked if it is
possible to get the best of both worlds [Worrall, 1989, p.101]:
“The main interest in the problem of scientific realism lies, I think,
in the fact that these two persuasive arguments appear to pull in
opposite directions; one seems to speak for realism and the other
against it; yet a really satisfactory position would need to have both
arguments on its side. The concern of the present paper is to in-
vestigate this tension between the two arguments and to suggest (no
more) that an old and hitherto mostly neglected position may offer
the best hope of reconciling the two.”
The way that the ESR attempts to resolve the miracle argument is basically
the statement that what is common to an outdated theory and a successor the-
ory are the relations between elements of the theories, the structures. In the
outdated theory, they described reality accurately enough, at least in a specific
regime, so that the old description was eligible. The successor theory extended
the application domain and incorporated the outdated old theory. The ontolog-
ical commitments might have changed while proceeding to the new theory; the
old theory might have introduced ontological entities that are superfluous in the
successor theory, but the structures between objects are common in both theo-
ries. Therefore, ESR gives attention to these structures, outlined in an example
on the theory of light [Worrall, 1989, p.117]:
“There was an important element of continuity in the shift from
Fresnel to Maxwell - and this was much more than a simple ques-
tion of carrying over the successful empirical content into the new
theory. ... There was continuity or accumulation in the shift, but
the continuity is one of form or structure, not of content.”
Concerning metaphysical concepts, ESR takes the position that metaphysical
statements have to follow our best theories and are not to be seen as first-order
principles [Worrall, 1989, p.123]:
“The only claim is that ultimately evidence leads the way: if, despite
all efforts, no scientific theory can be constructed which incorporates
our favourite metaphysical assumptions, then no matter how firmly
entrenched those principles might be, and no matter how fruitful they
may have proved in the past, they must ultimately be given up.”
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Emphasizing the structures as the elements of a theory that ensure continuity in
the shift from an outdated theory to a successor theory does not mean that ESR
neglects the objects or entities on the ontological level, as those elements are
connected by structures. Concerning mappings from theory elements to the on-
tological level, ESR advances a position considerably different than structuralist
approaches before [Worrall, 2007, p.154]:
“But there is no reason why the way in which a theory mirrors reality
should be the usual term-by-term mapping described by traditional
semantics.”
In the context of the classification scheme, ESR could be seen as giving credit
to a reality for objects, but not in an accessible way. The structures correspond
to elements we can access, but there is more on the ontological level, the re-
lata connected by the structures. These elements referring to the objects are
epistemologically hidden to us.
Figure 8: ESR in the classification scheme
And further concerning this mapping [Worrall, 2007, p.154]:
“SSR5 in fact takes it that the mathematical structure of a theory
may globally reflect reality without each of its components necessarily
referring to a separate item of that reality.”
This aspect involves a specific form of holism in the conception of ESR that
we cannot discuss in further detail here, but the relation to other holistic con-
ceptions such as [Bohm et al., 1987], [Quine, 1951] and for a recent review on
confirmational holism [Carlson, 2015], is an open question.
ESR holds a scientific realism that denies that scientific theories provide access
at all to these elements of reality Worrall [2007]:
“But why should a realist not be equally as fallibilist and tentative
about the mode of reference of the terms in theories as she is about
those theories truth? In any event, no one seriously holds, as I have
5Structural Scientific Realism, is the wording John Worral assigned to this program by
himself. Ladyman introduced ESR
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remarked several times, that we have any theory-independent access
to the furniture of the universe that would allow us to compare (even
in principle) the notions conjectured by our theories with what there
really is.”
To proponents of ESR, this inaccessibility is not an argument in favour of anti-
realism. In contrast to ESR, Ontic structural realism has been introduced as a
positivistic point of view on the structural realist account.
3.5.2 Ontic structural realism (OSR)
The origin of the ontic structural realism (OSR) is the distinction between
epistemological and ontic structuralist approaches provided by [Ladyman, 1998].
OSR as well as ESR emphasizes the role of structures as central elements of
ontology [Ladyman, 2016]:
“Ontic structural realists argue that what we have learned from con-
temporary physics is that the nature of space, time and matter are
not compatible with standard metaphysical views about the ontolog-
ical relationship between individuals, intrinsic properties and rela-
tions. On the broadest construal OSR is any form of structural real-
ism based on an ontological or metaphysical thesis that inflates the
ontological priority of structure and relations.”
The essential novelty of OSR is the neglection of the individual objects and their
properties as metaphysical and superfluous. Therefore, Ladymans position is
often referred to as radical OSR. A thorough review of the manifold views and
peculiarities concerning the difference between epistemological and ontic struc-
tural realism is presented in [Ladyman, 2016].
It is notable that OSR is a realist account, but confined to the structures. If we
identify the empirical content of the positivistic approaches by Sneed with the
structures in OSR, OSR could be seen in the positivistic tradition of Logical
Empircism. Then, OSR is a positivistic account concerning properties of objects
and individuality.
In the classification scheme, the OSR approach would refer to the ontological
Level 4, but only regarding the structures. Therefore, the identification of ele-
ments of reality is not due to properties of objects; it refers to structures and
relations.
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Figure 9: OSR in the classification scheme
One account that could be thought of as intermediate between ESR and radical
OSR is advocated by [Esfeld and Lam, 2008]. Moderate OSR holds the position
that relations without relata are inconceivable. Challenging the radical version,
[Esfeld and Lam, 2008, p.29] states:
“If it is claimed that there is something that exists but that we can-
not know, we need an argument why we should accept that there is
any such thing. The master argument for intrinsic properties can be
summed up in this way:
(1) Relations require relata, that is, objects that stand in the rela-
tions.
(2) These objects have to be something in themselves, that is, they
necessarily have some intrinsic properties over and above the rela-
tions that they bear to one anothereven if the relations do not su-
pervene on the intrinsic properties and even if we cannot know the
intrinsic properties.”
Moderate OSR takes a different position concerning the ontological status of
the objects and the relation. Following moderate OSR, they are ontologically
on the same level; none is primary.
Figure 10: Moderate OSR in the classification scheme
In the context of the presented classification scheme, this implies that there
exists elements of reality for the properties and the structures on the same
footing.
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Figure 11: An overview on the discussed points of view with respect to realism
and antirealism
We want to close this presentation of accounts on the structure of scientific the-
ories with an overview of the previously presented approaches and their relation
to each other, and the dichotomy of positivism and realism.
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3.6 Quine-Duhem thesis
The Quine-Duhem thesis is an approach that understands science as a system
of statements that are connected with each other. There are statements that
are far from experience; they form the center of a imagined sphere. Those
statements involve logic and mathematics. Located on the outer regions of the
sphere, connected to the realm of mathematics and logic, are those statements
that are in connection with experience. The scientific enterprise is represented
by the structure of this web of belief.
Figure 12: The web of belief
If science and the network of statements that forms our web of belief gets in
contradiction with experience, the whole web of belief is in contradiction. The
Quine-Duhem thesis will state the following:
It is equivalent, in our intention, to remove the contradiction if we add or mod-
ify a single statement on the outer shores of the web of belief, or if we modify
statements at the outermost heart of our system and thereby completely change
the whole web of belief.
The conception is called confirmational holism; it expresses that we never per-
form empirical tests in isolation. It challenges falsification, according to Popper
as well, because falsification would refer also to the whole web of belief. In the
sense of a parsimony principle of necessary modification during a contradiction,
it is worthwhile to aim for a minimum of needed modifications. This stance
is called Conservatism and is connected to the social psychology aspect of the
scientific enterprise [Stanford, 2016, Chapter 2.1]; keep as much as possible,
introduce as much as necessary.
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A recent example for the application of the Quine-Duhem thesis is the inter-
pretation of Quantum Mechanics. Although there is no contradiction with ex-
perience, the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics demonstrate a situation
where different sets of statements at the shores of the web of belief seem to be
equivalent. The Quine-Duhem thesis would see those interpretations as equiv-
alent, and there are even interpretations that demonstrate the change at the
very heart of the system. Quantum Logic is an approach in the interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics that modifies the statements in the realm of logic. For
an introduction, refer to [Mittelstaedt, 1978] or [Van Fraassen, 1980].
4 Statements about the ontological level
Statements that refer to metaphysical entities refer to the Level 4 of the classi-
fication scheme presented previously. Logical Empiricism denied the existence
of statements of that kind. We present our views on possible statements on the
metaphysical level.
4.1 Ontological coherence
The ontological coherence argument (OCA) is a heuristic that supports the
process of theory development from the perspective of ontological consistency in
a network of physical theories. Those theories offering ontological elements that
fit coherently with ontological elements from a different regime are preferable.
By the mutual consolidation of the ontological implications, the OCA supports
a network of theories that provides coherent ontologies. Thereby, OCA strongly
supports scientific realism and related ideas.
Theorem 1. Under the assumption of a set of Theories TPRµ, which covers dif-
ferent regimes of physics, and that TPRµ are theories in agreement with empirical
data in the respective regime, the OCA claims that those theories TPRν ∈ TPRµ,
whose ontologies fit coherently together, are preferable.
We define a set of elements of a theory TPR and a set of elements of reality PR:
TPRν = {tνi} = {Aν , Bν , Cν , ...} (3)
PRν = {νi} = {νA, νB , νC , ...} (4)
The set of elements of the theory and the elements of reality obey correspon-
dence rules that are part of the theory. We do not put detailed emphasis on
these correspondence rules. A detailed account on the mathematical definition
of these rules is provided by [Ludwig and Thurler, 2007].
We call two theories TPR theory-coherent if their corresponding elements of
reality fulfill the condition
25
PRα ∩ PRβ 6= ∅. (5)
This implies non-empty sets of elements of reality shared by two theories. In the
framework of scientific realism and its related ideas, this provides an argument
for an ontological value of those elements of reality.
Figure 13: The sets of elements of reality of two theories
Figure 14: Two sets of elements of reality of two theories
The idea of OCA is related to Ludwig’s account on the structure of scientific
theories. He introduced the reality domain of a physical theory and stated on
the constructed reality domain of all physical theories [Ludwig and Thurler,
2007, p.14]:
“We can now add that the reality domain W is the domain of all
W s, i.e., the W s of all PT s. Given that all PT s are not known,
W cannot be established. By finding new PT s, one discovers new
W s(e.g., atoms and elementary particles). The physically recordable
domain W remains decisively limited by the fact that one does not
permit all directly ascertainable facts such as, e.g., that a sound is
harmonious or that a violin has a good sound.”
And in an earlier account [Ludwig, 1978, p.186]:
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“Durch die Weiterentwicklung der Physik wird der durch alle PT s
zusammen erfassbare Teil der Wirklichkeit immer grer. Beim Auf-
stellen des Wirklichkeitsbereichs W einer PT kann bei diesem En-
twicklungsprozess des Erfassens eines Ausschnittes der Wirklichkeit
kein Widerspruch auftreten...; dagegen sind beim Zusammenfgen
der Wirklichkeitsbereiche der verschiedenen PT s im Laufe der his-
torischen Entwicklung der Physik immer wieder Widersprche der
einzelnen Wirklichkeitsbereiche untereinander und der Aussagen der
Theorie mit der Erfahrung entstanden.”
“By the evolution of physics the determined part of reality is grow-
ing. In the definition of a reality domain W of a physical theory PT
no contradiction can arise in this process of recognition of a part
of reality...; In contrast in the history of physics during the merg-
ing of reality domains of different PT s contradictions arose at all
time within reality domains and between statements of theories and
empirical evidences.6”
One specific contradiction in the reality domains that Ludwig refers to is the
contradiction between the particle picture and the wave picture in Quantum
Mechanics. We will give an account of this contradiction in Section 4.2, after
the definition of ontological truth.
6Translation by the author
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4.2 Ontological truth
Logical Empiricism avoids to provide ontological statements. In our context of
the classification scheme, this alludes to statements that refer to the Level 4.
Statements of that kind enclose metaphysical content and are superfluous in the
sense of Logical Empiricism’s doctrine to confine itself only to statements on
experience. If we ask for truth values of statements on metaphysical content,
Logical Empiricism would deny that such statements are meaningful.
Critical Rationalism would also deny that truth values on metaphysical state-
ments are meaningful at all. In Critical Rationalism, the argument would be
that metaphysical statements cannot be falsified by experience if the metaphys-
ical content does not refer to any experience [Popper, 2005].
We claim that this does not imply that scientific knowledge is not growing, or
that we can not learn more about how the world ”really” is. Assuming that it
is possible to learn about such a reality, which exists independent of us, is the
basic assumption of scientific realism and all its related positions. The assump-
tion is that there are statements on the metaphysical level that have truth values.
Objections against such a view are manifold. Most important to the author are
Scientific Underdetermination of theories[Stanford, 2016] and the Pessimistic
Meta Induction (PMI)[Laudan, 1981]. A summary of the PMI argument is
provided by [Ladyman, 2016]:
“Proposition p is widely believed by most contemporary experts, but p
is like many other hypotheses that were widely believed by experts in
the past and are disbelieved by most contemporary experts. We have
as much reason to expect p to befall their fate as not, therefore we
should at least suspend judgement about p if not actively disbelieve
it.”
For recents debates on the PMI argument, see [Fahrbach, 2009]; [Park, 2011]
and [Mu¨ller, 2015].
In favour of scientific realism, Hilary Putnam formulated the Miracle argument
[Putnam, 1975], which basically states that the success of explanation and pre-
diction of our best scientific theories would be a miracle if these theories do not
refer to a given reality beneath the level of theories.
Mathematical realists would see here a way with their approach of ontological
reality of mathematical entities to solve the ”miracle” in the miracle argument,
the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics [Wigner, 1960] and the question
on the nature of this metaphysical reality in one stroke.
The question on the nature of reality is still open, and as the recent discussions
on structural realism demonstrate, an end is not in sight. Too many questions
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are open or unclear and need a thorough analysis, but we want to present a
simple argument that provides a preliminary and confined answer to the question
of scientific knowledge and scientific progress:
Theorem 2. There exist statements on truth values on the level of ontologies
that result from empirical science. These statements always are exclusive state-
ments on ontologies.
Example: The earth is not a disk.
Example: The earth is not a sphere.
These statements are both true and can claim to refer to the ontological level.
We can state that the earth is not a disk, since we have an idea about the
theoretical term ”disk” and its ontological meaning. From experience, we could
deduce that the earth is not a disk. And the same for the statement that the
earth is not a sphere. The earth has an eccentricity and has properties that
definitely do not resemble those of a sphere. That is a statement that follows
from experience and refers to the ontological level of the entity earth.
We cannot provide an answer as to what the earth or any ontological entity is,
but we have access to empirical statements that help us in our quest on scientific
knowledge. One could give the objection that this is not very satisfying, because
the realm of those metaphysical entities which the earth potentially resembles
is very large, probably infinitely large. The statements we can provide only are
finite and it gives the impression that although we gain scientific knowledge, we
will not come to an end.
Figure 15: The relation of the terms to the ontological levels in the statement
Another debate that demonstrates the application of the concept of ontological
truth is the discussion on the Wave-particle duality, or in Bohr’s conception
Wave-particle complementarity. An introduction to the historical development
of methodologies of particle and wave-theory of light is provided by [Achinstein,
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1991]. An overview on the positions of wave-particle complementarity concern-
ing light is provided by [Combourieu and Rauch, 1992] and [Ghose and Home,
1996].
The classical concepts of particles and waves are, in principle, untenable in a
general way. A particle that is localized at a specific point in spacetime, car-
rying properties, is outworn in the same way as the concept of a completely
delocalized and holistic entity wave that is spread over space and time, reaching
into infinity. Both concepts are based on the Level 3 of the classification scheme
and represent an idea on an ontological entity. Following the conception of on-
tological truth, a statement of the kind ”light is a particle” or ”light is a wave”
cannot be a tenable statement on truth about the ontological entity light. Also,
a statement of the kind ”light is both particle and wave” is not valid according
to the conception of ontological truth.
The negated statements ”light is not a particle” and ”light is not a wave” would
fulfill the requirements on truth statements, as well as ”light is neither a particle
nor a wave.” It turned out that the classical conceptions particle and wave do not
represent concepts that fulfill the needs of our best theories. [Combourieu and
Rauch, 1992, p.1403-p.1404] provide a review of why these conceptions failed,
and Bohr had to introduce a principle to recover the classical conceptions:
“... no experimentalist has ever been able to show experimentally
this ”dual” behavior within the same experiment with a single par-
ticle and an experimental setup absolutely identical; in other words,
to violate the complementarity principle postulated by Niels Bohr in
1927, and since then accepted by the majority of physicists as an
operational principle to settle the wave-particle dualism problem. ...
No experimentalist ever has succeeded in detecting a single particle
travelling in one or the other branch of an interferometer (Michel-
son, Mach-Zehnder, or pure crystal) while analyzing simultaneously
the interference pattern which it is supposed to appear on a screen
located just behind the detectors”
Out of our best empirical theories, we get an idea about the properties and
behaviour of light; we can model a conception, but never unveil the whole truth
about an ontological entity.
[Callender, 2015] provides an account on resolving the wave-particle duality by
embedding the question into a greater philosophical framework and assuming
only one type of ontological entity:
“We have motivated the nomological understanding of the wavefunc-
tion. On this picture the It-or-Bit debate, and even the wave-or-
particle debate, are absorbed by a larger more philosophical debate
over the nature of laws. ...Regardless of whether one explores this
option, the main point is that quantum mechanics requires only one
type of beable.”
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The relation to scientific underdetermination and the unreasonable effectiveness
of mathematics should be discussed within the framework of ontological truth
and remains an open question.
There is a manifold of philosophical approaches on the question of truth values
of scientific statements. One prominent account is provided by Tarski [1944].
All those approaches are philosophical and exist somewhat parallel to each other
and it seems that they cannot be falsified by empirical evidences. The goal of
the stated theorem on ontological truth is to provide an insight on progress in
the quest for scientific knowledge, even if that implies to deny or stay agnostic
towards a convergent realism. Further, it clarifies that there are statements
with truth values even on the ontological level. That these statements have to
be formulated in a negative exclusive way resembles the falsificationism in the
empirical sciences.
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5 Application to Physics and the Interpretations
of Quantum Mechanics
5.1 Classical particle mechanics
If we apply the classification scheme presented previously to specific physical
theories and the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, it is reasonable to
demonstrate these principles by means of a well-known physical theory. We
have chosen classical particle mechanics to demonstrate the application of the
classification scheme.
A detailed presentation of classical particle mechanics by means of Sneed’s struc-
turalist approach has been provided by [Ishigaki, 1995]. We will demonstrate
the application of the classification scheme in a brief, incomplete, but illustrative
way.
Level 1 - The mathematical formalism
The mathematical formalism is set up by vector valued functions ~x and ~F in
the vector space R3 and a scalar m. The vectors or rather their components
are in generality functions of the free parameter time. The vector ~x(t) has a
derivation d~xdt we denote with ~v.
d(m~v)
dt
= ~F (6)
This is a linear second order differential equation. A solution is given by ~x(t).
Level 2 - Physical quantities and connection to empirical rules
In the Level 2 of the classification scheme, the physical quantities and their
representation by the mathematical symbols introduced in Level 1 are defined.
Definition 5. The physical quantity ”position” is represented by the vector ~x.
Definition 6. The physical quantity ”time” is represented by the parameter t.
Definition 7. The physical quantity ”mass” is represented by the scalar m.
Definition 8. The physical quantity ”force” is represented by the vector ~F .
The physical quantity ”position” represents results of measurements of the po-
sition coordinate of an object; for an extensive object, this will be the center of
mass coordinates, in case of a pointlike object, it will be the coordinates of the
point.
We adopt the SI-unit system to relate these physical quantities with empirical
statements.
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One peculiarity is that we cannot define a measurement procedure for the phys-
ical quantity force independently of the acceleration of the object unless we
introduced a source of a force, such as Newton’s gravitational law, which we
will omit.
Level 3 - Concepts and principles
We define the concept of a ”point particle” to describe the behaviour of extensive
objects and pointlike entities as well:
Definition 9. A point particle is defined by its position coordinate in space
represented by a vector ~x in the vector space R3, the parameter time t as well
as a set of associated properties. In the case of classical particle mechanics, this
set is containing the physical quantity ”mass.”
The full power of the formalism of classical particle mechanics is available when
we relate it with other specific laws of force. Therefore, the conception of a force
is needed.
Definition 10. A force is an interaction between an object and the origin of
the specific force. The object will change the motion of the object according to
the defined law, depending on the quantity of the force and its set of properties.
With that definition of force, concrete laws of force can be introduced, such as
the gravitational law, Hooke’s law, or friction. This interrelates the theory to
other theories, which is the idea of the conception of links in Sneed’s structuralist
approach.
Level 4 - Ontology
The ontological statements on classical particle mechanics involve connected
ontologies of space and time, according to the OCA, and involves them in the
ontological level of the classical particle mechanics.
Classical particle mechanics is based on a particle and matter ontology in which
there are entities named particles made of matter that exist in a pre-existing
space and alter their positions due to a time parameter according to real in-
fluences and interactions by forces. The forces are on the same ontological
footing, in that sense as real, as the particles and represent the interaction pro-
cess between particles with other entities. This ontology is deeply related to
materialism, which has the view that what there is, is a matter in motion in a
pre-existing space and time framework.
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Overview
1 m ¨~x(t) =
N∑
i=1
~F (t)i
2
x... center-of-mass coordinate of an object
m ... interial mass of an object
N∑
i=1
~Fi ... sum of all forces
Measurement rules for ~F ,m, ~x(t), t
3 Point particle concept
4
Entity of matter - Materialism
Position in space and time
Table 3: Classical particle mechanics
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5.2 De Broglie-Bohm interpretation
The De Broglie-Bohm interpretation is a realistic, deterministic, nonlocal7 hidden-
variable interpretation and is based on the decomposition of the Schro¨dinger
equation into a set of two equations. One equation is interpreted as the con-
servation of probability, and the other equation is interpreted as a Hamilton
Jacobi equation with an extra term. This term is interpreted as a Quantum
Potential. From the Hamilton Jacobi equation, an equation of motion for the
particles can be derived, which is called guidance equation. In the De-Broglie
Bohm interpretation, nonlocality is an important and inherent feature of Quan-
tum Mechanics, but is only an aspect of a much deeper principle that is central
to the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation, the concept of ontological holism. The
De Broglie-Bohm interpretation must be distinguished from Bohmian Mechan-
ics, which is based on the same formalism, but adheres to a different conception
and ontology. We will present Bohmian Mechanics in section 5.3. For a detailed
presentation of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation, refer to [Bohm and Curd,
1981] and [Holland, 1995].
Level 1 - The mathematical formalism
ψ : R3N × R→ C (7)
ψ = ψ(~qk, t) (8)
k = 1, ..., N (9)
ψ = Rei
S
~ (10)
R : R3N × R→ R (11)
S : R3N × R→ R (12)
i~
∂ψ
∂t
(~q, t) = −
N∑
k=1
~2
2mk
∆kψ(~q, t) + V (~q)ψ(~q, t) (13)
∂S
∂t
+
N∑
k=1
(∇kS)2
2mk
+
N∑
k=1
−~
2∇2kR
2mkR
+ V = 0 (14)
∂(R2)
∂t
+
N∑
k=1
∇k · R
2∇kS
mk
= 0 (15)
7Locality is the concept that events are independent of all other events that are space-like
separated. Nonlocality abolishes this restriction, and therefore events can have an instanta-
neous influence on space-like separated events, but superluminal signalling is still restricted
in this interpretation.
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Level 2 - Physical quantities and connection to empirical
rules
The mathematical level contains the Schro¨dinger equation. Every complex val-
ued function can be written in a polar form of the kind in equation (11) with
two real valued functions, R and S. Applying the polar form on the Schro¨dinger
equation, one obtains equations (14) and (15). This is just a reformulation of
the Schro¨dinger equation.
Interpreting equation (14), one sees that it resembles the Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tion of classical mechanics. A detailed account of Hamilton-Jacobi theory in the
context of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation is provided by [Holland, 1995,
p.27]. The term S resembles the action of classical mechanics, but there is an
additional term that has no counterpart in classical Hamilton-Jacobi mechanics;
it is the term we will denote by Q and is usually named Quantum potential:
Q =
N∑
k=1
−~
2∇2kR
2mkR
(16)
The Quantum potential is interpreted on the same footing as a potential energy,
but due to its structure, it has some specific properties that are emphasized as
in-formational [Holland, 1995, p.89]:
“Thus contary to what one might expect in a classical wave, a particle
does not respond to the intensity of the wave in its vicinity, but rather
to its form.”
The proponents of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation often make use of a radio-
wave analogy for the Quantum potential and the in-formational character. The
radio waves that control the movement of a remote-controlled vehicle carry an
in-formational content that is independent of the amplitude of the radio wave.
Essential is its informational content that guides the remote controlled object.
In the sense needed on Level 2 we interpret the term Q as a potential, equally
important to the guidance of the particle as the classical potential V .
By interpreting equation (14) as a Hamilton-Jacobi type equation in the De
Broglie Bohm interpretation, one concludes that there are equations of motions
for the individual systems [Holland, 1995]:
“... let us construct a vector field ... and assume that the latter
defines at each point of space at each instant the tangent to a possible
particle trajectory passing through that point. This naturally provides
a description of an ensemble of particles, which is fictitious in the
sense that only one track is realized in any given field ...”
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For one particle, this vector field is given by
d~q
dt
=
~p
m
=
∇S
m
. (17)
This equation is called guidance equation and provides a set of trajectories as
solutions. In a many-particle situation, the guidance equation is given by
d~qk
dt
=
∇kS
mk
. (18)
The ~qk(t) represent the positions of the particles at specific times t.
The interpretation of the function R is consistent with the Born interpretation
in some aspects, but not in all [Bohm et al., 1987, p.325]: In that sense equation
(15) ...
“... can evidently be regarded as a continuity equation with P = R2
being a probability density, as Born suggested. The function P has,
however, two interpretations, one through the Quantum Potential
and the other through the probability density. It is our proposal that
the fundamental meaning of R (and therefore indirectly of P ) is that
it determines the Quantum Potential. A secondary meaning is that
it gives the probability density for the particle to be at a certain
position. Here we differ from Born who supposed that it was the
probability of finding the particle there in a suitable measurement.”
Level 3 - Concepts and principles
Particle and wave conception: A particle lives in the R3 and is defined by
its particle trajectory qk(t). A particle is guided by the wave function or two
real valued components R and S [Holland, 1995, p.277]:
“When we speak of a ”many body system” we mean then a single
wavefunction together with a set of particles. There is in general no
wave associated just with each particle individually.”
It is important to emphasize this aspect of the many particle situation in the De
Broglie-Bohm interpretation, as an essential point gets lost if one studies only
the single particle situation. In the single particle case, the configuration space
is a R3 and isomorphic to the physical space R3. This gives the impression that
the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation is acting on the physical space. In fact, it
does, but only the positions qk(t) refer to physical space, and the functions R
and S and therefore the ψ live on the R3N configuration space.
In the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation, the wave function has no primary con-
ceptual status; it is decomposed in the two real valued functions R and S.
Nevertheless, the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation refers also to the wave func-
tion and outlines characteristics. We follow the presentation by [Holland, 1995,
p.83-84] and present those aspects relevant to our discussion:
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• There is no source of the ψ-field. It has no localized origin.
• There is no ontological construction for a medium where the ψ-function
oscillates on.
• Due to the formal construction of the Quantum potential influences by the
ψ-function are independent of the intensity and therefore nonlocalities are
easily realised.
• Due to the formal construction of the Quantum potential, influences by the
ψ-function are independent of the intensity of the ψ-function respectively
of the function R and therefore nonlocalities are easily realised.
Hidden variables: The De Broglie-Bohm interpretation is a hidden variable
theory; these hidden variables are the particles positions ~qk(t)and their initial
values ~qo.
Quantum potential: One conception is emphasized in the De Broglie-Bohm
interpretation. It is the conception of the Quantum potential represented by
equation (16). The Quantum potential plays the key role role in the conceptual
apparatus of the the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation [Holland, 1995, p.78]:
“The introduction of the quantum potential as a causal agent has
explanatory power which one unnecessarily forgoes by concentrating
on just (3.2.19)8. It represents the difference between classical and
quantum mechanics.”
Though proponents of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation claim a resemblance
of the mathematical apparatus with classical mechanics, particularly Hamilton-
Jacobi mechanics, they do not aim for a return to classical conceptions or ontol-
ogy. The Hamilton-Jacobi formalism is merely a unified language that speaks
about phenomena in classical and quantum context [Holland, 1995, p.78]:
“The radical departure from classical notions inherent in the causal
interpretation9 lies in the details of the model, in the types of motions
that are accessible to particles.”
8The guidance equation.
9The De Broglie-Bohm interpretation is often referred to as the causal interpretation.
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Level 4 - Ontology
Particle and wave ontology: The particle ontology of the De Broglie-Bohm
interpretation leads to a new conception of matter [Holland, 1995, p.65]:
“The classical theory of matter, ... has been replaced by a more
general conception in which matter has an intrinsic field aspect, the
mass points moving and interacting under the influence of the new
internal energy as well as the more familiar potentials of classical
dynamics. This leads to a synthesis of the wave and particle charac-
teristics of matter. These properties are not mutually exclusive, but
simultaneously existent. ”
A particle is not only an entitiy represented by a set of properties and a position.
In the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation, the particle conception goes beyond that
classical naive representation of particles [Bohm et al., 1987]:
“As the theory develops, we shall find that the electron is by no means
a structureless particle. Rather, what is suggested by its behaviour is
that it is a highly complex entity that is deeply affected by its quan-
tum field in an extremely subtle and dynamic way. Moreover, this
entity is not to be regarded (as is done in the usual interpretations)
as somehow directly possessing both particle-like and wave-like prop-
erties. Rather, the observed wave-like properties will follow, as we
shall see, from the general effect of the quantum wave field on the
complex structure of the particle. ”
The particle wave ontology is not a simple replacement of the classical wave
and particle pictures by an assertion that quantum systems behave in some
situations wave-like and in some situations particle-like. It is more; it is the view
that matter behaves in a novel way in the quantum regime that is incompatible
with both ontological pictures of particle and waves alike. On the question, what
are the quantum objects, an appropriate answer would be: something different.
Active information and the causa formalis: The De Broglie-Bohm inter-
pretation emphasizes a conception of in-formation that is related to the Aris-
totelian causa formalis [Bohm and Curd, 1981, p.16]:
“In more modern language, it would be better to describe this as
formative cause, to emphasize that what is involved is not a mere
form imposed from without, but rather an ordered and structured
inner movement that is essential to what things are”
By proponents of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation this term was used to
describe this feature in sense of an in-formation: Active information. [Hiley and
Pylkkanen, 2005, p.19] describes its features:
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“The proposal is that active information at the quantum level orga-
nizes the dynamical evolution of the system itself. ... As we remarked
earlier, the quantum potential appears to be some kind of internal en-
ergy which carries information about the environment. Therefore we
consider the idea that the whole process, particle plus active environ-
ment (which in terms of a measurement requires the specification of
experimental conditions), is being formed partly from within. This
suggests that the process is more organic than mechanical.”
Active information can be understood in the sense of the radio-wave remote-
controlled vehicle. The vehicle’s motions depend not only on its own local laws,
but on some information on the environment provided by a formative cause.
A recent account on the role of the Quantum potential in the context with
Active information is provided by [Dennis et al., 2015].
Ontological Holism: The De Broglie-Bohm interpretation advances an on-
tological holism. The Quantum potential reflects this holism and is the element
in the theory that acts in the sense of this wholeness [Bohm et al., 1987, p.340]:
“We have seen thus far that the quantum behaviour of matter shows
a certain kind of wholeness, brought about by the quantum potential.
This latter functions as active information that may reflect distant
features of the environment and may give rise to a non-local con-
nection between particles that depends on the quantum state of the
whole, in a way that is not expressible in terms of the relationships
of the particles alone.”
According to the ontology advanced by the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation,
there is a wholeness in the very nature of reality that is hidden to us in some
branches of phenomena, like classical physics, but revealed by Quantum theory.
Wholeness in that respect affects also the weight and relevance of our scientific
theories [Bohm and Curd, 1981, p.21-p.22]:
“We thus to be alert to give careful attention and serious considera-
tion to the fact that our theories are not descriptions of reality as it
is, but rather ever-changing forms of insight, which can point to or
indicate a reality that is implicit and not describable or specifiable in
its totality.”
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Overview
We present the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation structure according to the Clas-
sification scheme in an overview. Differences from Bohmian Mechanics, which
will be presented in section 5.3, are discussed in the conclusion.
1
∂S
∂t +
∑N
k=1
(∇kS)2
2mk
+
∑N
k=1−~
2∇2kR
2mkR
+ V = 0
∂(R2)
∂t +
∑N
k=1∇k · R
2∇kS
mk
= 0
2
~qk(t)... position of an object at time t
mk ... mass of a particle
S ... Hamilton Jacobi function or action
R2 ... probability
Q ... Quantum potential
Measurement rules for ~qk(t),mk, R
2
3
Particle and wave conception
Hidden variables
Quantum potential
4
Novel matter ontology
Active information
Wholeness and ontological holism
Table 4: Classification scheme of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation
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5.3 Bohmian Mechanics
Bohmian Mechanics is a reconstruction of Quantum Mechanics based on the
ideas of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation, but postulates the guidance equa-
tion for particle positions and not as a consequence of the Schro¨dinger equation.
It reproduces the results and experimental predictions of standard Quantum
Mechanics, and is a realistic, deterministic, nonlocal hidden-variable theory. Its
fundamental ontological entities are the particles and their position. We analyse
Bohmian Mechanics for N-particle systems without spin, because one-particle
systems easily give a wrong impression on the nature of Bohmian Mechanics.
Main proponents of Bohmian Mechanics are Detlef Du¨rr, Sheldon Goldstein
and Nino Zanghi. For further reading, see [Du¨rr and Teufel, 2009] and [Cushing
et al., 2013].
Level 1 - The mathematical formalism
The mathematical level consists of two equations: the Schro¨dinger equation and
the guidance equation. The function Ψ is a mapping from a R3N vector space
to the complex numbers together with the free parameter t.
ψ : R3N × R→ C (19)
(~q, t) 7→ ψ(~q, t) (20)
~q =

~q1
.
.
.
~qN
 ∈ R3N (21)
i~
∂ψ
∂t
(~q, t) = −
N∑
k=1
~2
2mk
∆kψ(~q, t) + V (~q)ψ(~q, t) (22)
d~Qk
dt
=
~
mk
=∇kψ
ψ
( ~Q, t) (23)
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Level 2 - Physical quantities and connection to empirical
rules
Many-particle Bohmian Mechanics assigns properties to the k−th particle10, its
mass mk, and its trajectory represented by a vector ~Qk(t) ∈ R3. This trajectory
refers to the empirical accessible positions of particles11 in time.
The laws of motion for N particles are formulated in a R3N configuration space,
where the complex valued ψ function is defined. The ψ function obeys equation
(22). A solution can be provided when the function V (~q) is defined. V (~q)
represents the physical potentials the particles are exposed to. The ψ function
is called wave function.
The trajectories of the particles obey equation (23), which defines the trajecto-
ries due to the wave function, which is itself a solution of equation (22). The
initial conditions of Qk(t) and
dQk(t)
dt have to be defined to find unique solutions
for the trajectories.
The statistical distributions of quantum systems are reproduced by Bohmian
Mechanics; specifically, by the Quantum Equilibrium hypothesis [Du¨rr and
Teufel, 2009, p.153]:
“Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis. For an ensemble of identical
systems, each having the wave function ψ, the typical empirical dis-
tribution of the configurations of the particles is given approximately
by ρ = |ψ|2. In short, Borns statistical law holds.”
This is a brief summary of the most important definitions and conceptions
within Bohmian Mechanics. Some aspects of the physical formalism presented
here follow out of a principle, the already introduced Quantum Equilibrium
hypothesis.
10A conception that will be defined on level three
11In the sense of the empirical phenomena.
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Level 3 - Concepts and principles
Quantum equilibrium hypothesis: The quantum equilibrium hypothesis has the
status of a concept or first principle in Bohmian Mechanics.
The empirical statistical distributions of quantum systems are reproduced by
Bohmian Mechanics; specifically by the Quantum Equilibrium hypothesis. It
can be shown by Bohmian Mechanics that if a quantum system’s positions are
distributed according to Born’s statistical interpretation, then they will stay
in this quantum equilibrium. The evolution of the ψ function maintains the
quantum equilibrium [Du¨rr and Teufel, 2009, p.211ff].
Particle and wave conception: Particle: A particle is represented by a tra-
jectory ~Qk(t) and lives in the R3.
The wave assigned to Quantum Theory is represented by the wave function ψ
and lives in the configuration space R3N .
Hidden variables: Bohmian Mechanics is a hidden variable theory; these
hidden variables are the particle’s positions and their initial values.
Level 4 - Ontology
Particle Ontology: Bohmian Mechanics advances a strict particle ontology.
The ontological objects are the particles, some of their properties and their
positions [Du¨rr and Teufel, 2009, p.142]:
“Bohmian Mechanics will ecplain that it is correct to say ”is” for
the positions of the systems particles, but that it is not correct to say
”is” for other ”observables”.”
Du¨rr alludes to the fact that not all observables have an ontological status. In
fact, position plays a distinguished role. Momentum or spin are not on the same
ontological footing. They are not properties of the particles, the ontological
objects themselves.
A further aspect of the particle ontology is that it is an object ontology. There
are objects out there; these objects are the particles in a physical real space. Re-
ferring to the structuralist approaches where structures play an important role,
moderate ontological structural realism or even more epistemological structural
realism would be philosophical stances that are compatible with Bohmian Me-
chanics.
All particles are guided by the wave function simultaneously, but this wave
function lives in the configuration space, which has a dimension depending on
the number of particles involved, or if we assume the wave function of the
universe, it would have a dimension according to the number of particles in the
universe. But it is not that easy to abandon the ontological footing of the wave
function [Esfeld et al., 2013, p.5-6]:
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“There is indeed a prima facie good reason to do so and to admit
the wave-function as a further concrete physical entity in addition
to the particles. ”
Mainly, the reason for this is grounded on the causal relation of the wave function
to the movement of the particles. The aim for such a causal connection that the
wave function is a guiding field led De Broglie to propose the original version
of the guidance conception for the wave function. A further problem of this
ontology would be [Esfeld et al., 2013, p.7]:
“However, if one admits configuration space as a further stage of
physical reality in addition to and independent of three-dimensional
physical space , it is unclear how there could be a real connection
between these two spaces that could amount to something existing in
the one space guiding or piloting the motion of entities existing in
the other one. ”
The possibilities of solving this ontological connection range from neglecting the
idea of any ontological footing of the wave function, overassigning the wave func-
tion to physical space, to the position that configuration space itself represents
a fundamental ontology [Esfeld et al., 2013, p.7].
Two positions seem promising and represent an ontological dualism within
Bohmian Mechanics: Humeanism and Dispositionalism [Esfeld et al., 2013,
p.25]:
“...Humeanism more precisely, Lewis thesis of Humean superve-
nience: the world according to quantum mechanics can be a vast
mosaic of local matters of particular fact, namely the spatio-temporal
distribution of the elements posed in the primitive ontology such as
particle positions. The universal wave-function and the laws of quan-
tum mechanics supervene on this distribution. They are nothing
more than devices of economical bookkeeping, there being no real
connections among the elements of the primitive ontology... ”
[Esfeld et al., 2013] emphasize that the mere fact of the the existence of an
approach like Bohmian Mechanics refutes the view that Quantum Mechanics is
in contradiction with Humeanism. In this view, the wave function is a instru-
mentalistic element of the theory without any footing in ontology. It is helpful
to describe the situation but gives no deeper insight in the nature of reality. A
classical analogy would be the center of mass of a bulk of matter. The center of
mass conception is very helpful, but no ontological speciality is located at the
position of the center of mass of the bulk of matter. It is just a nomological
entity.
Dispositionalism, on the other hand, is the view that there is an inherent prop-
erty of local beables, the particles, that ensures their evolution in a specific way.
To [Esfeld et al., 2013] it brings the advantage that:
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“... one can include something in the ontology that accounts for the
temporal development of the local beables, without having to resort
to accepting the wave-function in configuration space as an element
of physical reality.”
[Esfeld et al., 2013] favour dispositionalism but admit that it is an open research
project to clarify the eligibility in foundation of physics:
“On the question of Humeanism versus dispositionalism we side with
dispositionalism, since we take it to be a sound demand to call for
something in the ontology that accounts for the temporal development
of the elements of physical reality and that grounds the law of motion,
thus providing for real connections in nature.”
Nonlocality and Holism: Bohmian Mechanics is a nonlocal theory and its
ontology is also nonlocal and in some sense holistic [Du¨rr and Teufel, 2009,
p.131]:
“What is new12 is that the description of nature needs a function
on the configuration space of all particles in the system. And why is
that revolutionary? The point is that such a description involves all
particles in the universe at once, whence all particles are ”entangled”
with each other,...”
The Nonlocality in Bohmian Mechanics reflects an ontological holism as pro-
posed in the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation, but Bohmian Mechanics puts no
emphasis on this aspect and takes it merely as a consequence of the mentioned
dispositions of the evolution of the local beables.
12In Quantum Mechanics compared to classical physics.
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Overview
We apply the classification scheme to give an overview on the structure of
Bohmian Mechanics. Significant differences concerning all levels of the clas-
sification scheme between the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation and Bohmian
Mechanics are evident.
1
i~∂ψ∂t (~q, t) = −
∑N
k=1
~2
2mk
∆kψ(~q, t) + V (~q)ψ(~q, t)
d~Qk
dt =
~
mk
=∇kψψ ( ~Q, t)
2
~Qk(t)... trajectory of the k − th particle
mk ... of the k − th particle
ψ(~q, t) ... wave function in the R3N
ρ = |ψ|2... Born’s statistical interpretation
Measurement rules for Qk(t),mk, ρ
3
Point particle concept
Quantum equilibrium hypothesis
4
Particle ontology
Position in R3 space and time
Wave ontology: Humeanism vs Dispositionalism
Table 5: Classification scheme of Bohmian Mechanics
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6 Conclusion
We presented a classification scheme to provide a tool to distinguish interpre-
tations of Quantum Mechanics concerning their conceptions, formalism and
ontology. The classification scheme consists of four levels, which refer to the
mathematical formalism, the interpretation of the formalism, the used concepts
and the ontological level. The first three refer to the theory; the latter contains
the metaphysical implications of the theory.
In philosophy of science, a manifold field of conceptual approaches on the struc-
ture of physical theories developed in the last century. We presented the relation
of these approaches to our introduced classification scheme. We started with
Einstein’s model of layers of a scientific theory that represented only the progress
of a scientific theory in respect to its formal most simple representation. With
the advent of Logical Empiricism positions on the structure of scientific theories
also developed. We presented the received view and its successors the semantic
view and the structuralist approaches. All of these positions have to be seen in
the dichotomy of realist and anti-realist positions.
Out of the structuralist approaches, the position of structural realism evolved,
which developed directly related to Quantum Mechanics and the debates on the
foundations of its interpretation.
Concerning the ontological level of a physical theory, we proposed two argu-
ments that refer to the interrelation between two or more physical theories and
to the relation between theoretical terms and ontological truth.
The Ontological Coherence Argument is a heuristic that provides advice as to
which theories should be adopted based on their ontological relations to other
theories.
Concerning the truth values of scientific theories, we provided a theorem on
ontological truth, which states that scientific knowledge is something that is
cumulative on one hand, but not convergent on the other hand. The theorem
reflects the progress of science by acknowledging the value of exclusive state-
ments and their contribution to the growth of scientific knowledge.
We propose that the Ontological Coherence Argument is applied implicitly by
proponents of a realist point of view in the interpretations of Quantum Me-
chanics when they adopt a Bohmian-type or a Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber-position.
A realist view in the sense of a pre-existing framework of space and time and
properties of objects, as realised by theory of relativity, is supported by both
positions in Quantum Mechanics. To proponents of a realist point of view, as
in the mentioned interpretations, this coherence of different theories is a strong
supporting argument.
Since the interpretation of space-time is an open question in philosophy of sci-
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ence as well, the Ontological Coherence Argument can provide support here as
a useful heuristic by relating interpretational problems of Quantum Mechanics
with interpretational problems of space-time. Structural realism is applied in
both fields, and is a promising conception for solving interpretational questions.
The relation of these two arguments to scientific underdetermination and the
unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics remains an open question and is sub-
ject to future work.
We demonstrated the classification scheme by means of classical particle me-
chanics, and applied it to the field of interpretations of Quantum Mechanics by
the example of the De Broglie-Bohm Interpretation and Bohmian Mechanics.
The classification scheme demonstrates the differences in the conception, the
mathematical formalism and the ontology of these two interpretations of Quan-
tum Mechanics. In the case of Bohmian Mechanics and the De Broglie-Bohm
Interpretation, the classification scheme demonstrated the profound differences
in the concepts and ontology of these two approaches. Whereas Bohmian Me-
chanics emphasizes a particle conception and ontology, the De Broglie-Bohm In-
terpretation emphasizes holism and an abandoning of reductionism. We demon-
strated that despite, in literature, the two approaches are mixed up or seen as
only one approach, the conceptions and ontologies are radically different.
The application of the classification scheme to other interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics can be done in a straightforward way and is subject to future work.
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